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THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 
JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR.* 
Professor powell paints a sweeping account of the relationship between the 
Enlightenment and law.  I agree with the basic thrust of his argument, and I 
applaud his ability to make connections between the broad scope of intellectual 
history and developments in law.1  I have previously written about the 
interconnection between philosophical ideals and the development of legal-
economic theory as it particularly relates to tort law theory.2  Through his 
extension of these ideas into other areas of law, Professor powell illustrates 
their wide implications. 
As Professor powell highlights, one of the principal tenets of the 
Enlightenment is the belief in rationality and the focus on the individual as the 
emphasis of analysis.3  This individualistic ideal is the foundation of 
neoclassical economics, which I have previously detailed.4  It is also the 
foundation for modern finance theory, which ascended with neoclassical 
economics and has a close relationship with it both theoretically and 
institutionally. 
Currently, given changes in scientific and philosophical views, these 
Enlightenment ideals have begun to come under assault.  We see this in 
notions of uncertainty in quantum theory within science and in the 
neopragmatist turn in philosophy.5  Care needs to be taken, however, with 
regard to the implications of our post-Enlightenment times.  The emergence of 
post-Enlightenment perspectives does not signal the end of Enlightenment 
 
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.  I wish to thank all of the Childress 
Lecture participants, particularly john powell, for their stimulating insights that helped me shape 
this paper.  I also want to thank the Childress Lecture organizers for sponsoring the event.  Two 
of my colleagues at Northeastern, David Phillips and Dan Schaffer, provided valuable comments 
on earlier drafts of this Article.  I also benefited from very thoughtful comments from Daniel 
Walkowitz at the Second Annual J.S. Intellectual History Conference. 
 1. See generally john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond 
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035 (2010). 
 2. JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007). 
 3. ROY PORTER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 2–3 (2d ed. 2001). 
 4. HACKNEY, supra note 2, at 145. 
 5. Id. at 121–28. 
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influences as a descriptive matter, nor should it, at least in my opinion, as a 
normative matter.  Enlightenment ideals are and should play an important role 
in our quest for knowledge acquisition even in a post-Enlightenment world.  I 
believe that it is better to state the role of the relationship between 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ideas as being in a metaphorical 
conversation with each other.  Enlightenment thought does and should play a 
continuing role in our quest for knowledge.  Yet given the insights that we 
have developed since the Enlightenment, we must augment, and at times 
reconsider, forms of knowledge associated with the Enlightenment (including 
rationality).  Ironically, Enlightenment ideals may put us in the best position to 
undertake this reevaluation given the Enlightenment’s emphasis on 
empiricism.6  Modern finance theory provides a notable exemplar of my thesis 
regarding the Enlightenment and its relationship to the post-Enlightenment era.  
Further, these musings about finance theory, the Enlightenment, and post-
Enlightenment thinking are not merely an academic exercise because finance 
theory has impacted world economies in profound ways—including the 2008 
financial crisis. 
Modern portfolio theory is the foundation upon which the edifice of 
corporate finance theory has been erected.7  The theory posits that a rational 
investor will invest in a diversified portfolio of securities—the mix of which 
will depend upon his or her tolerance for risk.8  There are many technical 
nuances associated with modern portfolio theory beyond the scope of this 
Article.9  It is telling, however, that Harry Markowitz, the originator of 
portfolio theory and widely regarded as the founder of modern corporate 
finance theory, in a discussion with budding finance students emphasized that 
they not only focus on the technical aspects of finance theory, but also consider 
philosophical issues.10  Markowitz specifically referenced Rene Descartes’ 
First Meditation,11 David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding12 (“Human Understanding”), and Leonard Savage’s The 
 
 6. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1041 (describing the empirical hallmark of the 
Enlightenment). 
 7. Much of my description of corporate finance theory is derived from a more technical 
description in STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE 
FINANCE THEORY 261–87 (7th ed. 2005). 
 8. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF 
INVESTMENTS 6 (2d ed. 1991). 
 9. Id. at 37. 
 10. Interview by Steve Buser with Hennry M. Markowitz at Rady School of Management at 
the University of California, San Diego (October 8, 2004) [hereinafter Markowitz Interview]. 
 11. RENE DESCARTES, First Meditation, in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS 95–
101 (Penguin Classic 1998) (1641). 
 12. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 23 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2007) (1748). 
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Foundations of Statistics.13  Each of these works exemplifies Enlightenment 
ideals in their own way. 
The First Meditation sets up Descartes’ starting point for philosophical 
analysis.  He is very skeptical about his ability to know through the senses.14  
Descartes appreciates the physical sciences (e.g., physics, astronomy, and 
medicine), but he is particularly attracted to the axiomatic sciences (e.g., 
arithmetic and geometry).15  Descartes’s devotion to the idea of scientific 
discovery and the power of science may have been most important to 
Markowitz, though.  The First Meditation is infused with an ethos that science 
holds the key to knowledge acquisition.16  This fixation with science is very 
much a hallmark of the Enlightenment, and it is evident in Markowitz’s work 
and throughout the rest of corporate finance theory. 
David Hume is a central figure of the Enlightenment, and a key component 
of Hume’s thought is his emphasis on empiricism.  In his Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Hume adopted a skeptical position regarding human 
knowledge acquisition and drew a distinction between demonstrative (logical) 
and probable (empirical) reasoning.17  Probable reason according to Hume is, 
by its very nature, uncertain, and it must be guided by both experience and 
from our inference from evidence (which Hume referred to as “custom”).18  In 
his treatise, Hume put forth the philosophical basis for probability theory—the 
mathematical method of deriving inferences from experience.19  This method 
would later serve as the foundation for contemporary statistics.20 
According to Markowitz, Leonard Savage (who was Markowitz’s statistics 
professor at the University of Chicago) taught him that “a rational agent acting 
under uncertainty would act according to ‘probability beliefs’ where no 
objective probabilities are known.”21  This is indeed the lesson one would draw 
from Savage’s classic, The Foundations of Statistics.22  Savage takes the 
foundation of statistics to be probability.23  His theory is part of a movement 
that departs from the sort of historical intuitivism that focused on gathering and 
 
 13. LEONARD SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (Dover Publications 1972) 
(1954). 
 14. DESCARTES, supra note 11, at 96. 
 15. Id. at 98. 
 16. See id. at 95–101. 
 17. HUME, supra note 12, at 25–26. 
 18. Id. at 32. 
 19. Id. at 32–34. 
 20. J. Durbin, Statistics and Statistical Science, 140 J. ROV. STATIST. SOC., A 177, 185 
(1987). 
 21. Harry M. Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, Nobel Lecture, (December 7, 
1990), in ECONOMIC SCIENCES 280 (World Sci. Pub. 1992). 
 22. SAVAGE, supra note 13. 
 23. Id. 
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condensing data, by replacing it with an emphasis on statistical inference 
through mathematical techniques and logical reasoning.24  Savage frames this 
as being based on a “personalistic” view of probability, which he defines quite 
succinctly as follows: 
Personalistic views hold that probability measures the confidence that a 
particular individual has in the truth of a particular proposition, for example, 
the proposition that it will rain tomorrow.  These views postulate that the 
individual concerned is in some ways ‘reasonable,’ . . . .25 
The reason that this probabilistic approach is necessary is that individuals must 
make decisions under uncertainty.26  Savage builds up a “highly idealized 
theory of the behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect to decisions.”27  This 
is precisely the form of theory that underpins Markowitz’s portfolio theory. 
In Portfolio Selection,28 Markowitz articulates the following premises: 
First, uncertainty with regard to risk is the salient feature in thinking about how 
individuals make investment decisions.29  Second, the investor is assumed to 
behave as the rational man would.30  The rational man is perfect in the sense 
that he has access to all available information, makes no error in calculations, 
and has no biases.31  But he is not omniscient.32  If the rational man were all 
knowing, then the requirement of the first criterion, uncertainty, would not 
hold.  Finally, the investor is risk averse.33  He would prefer greater returns but 
less risk (uncertainty).34 
While portfolio theory is based on relatively sophisticated mathematics, 
the basic intuition is quite simple.  Assume that an individual is looking for 
opportunities to invest.  She could invest in a single asset, i.e., Company A 
stock.  Portfolio theory demonstrates that the investor would necessarily be 
better off investing in a portfolio of securities.35  If she invests in both 
Company A stock and Company B stock, she will be able to reduce her risk for 
 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Id. at 6. 
 27. SAVAGE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 28. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION 205–07 (2d ed. Basil Blackwell 1991) 
(1959) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION] (a monograph length treatment of the 
path breaking ideas Markowitz had put forward in 1952 regarding portfolio selection); Harry M. 
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77–91 (1952). 
 29. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION, supra note 28, at 206. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. Stephen B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1608 
(1971). 
 35. Id. at 1609. 
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any given level of return—assuming that the two stocks are not perfectly 
correlated (i.e., they do not react exactly the same to changes in the market).  
The reason for this is that since the two stocks react differently to market 
changes, they effectively hedge the risk of each other.  This two-asset example 
is extended in portfolio theory to arrive at a very general claim: as an investor 
increases her holding of assets in a portfolio, she is able to eliminate virtually 
all individual asset risk (unsystematic risk) and is only left with market risk 
(systematic risk).36  The upshot of this is that all rational and risk averse 
investors (again, a general assumption in corporate finance theory) will hold 
diversified portfolios.37 
An implication of portfolio theory is that the correct measure of risk is not 
the way in which an individual security reacts to market shifts but, rather, its 
contribution to the risk of a portfolio.  A key move in finance theory is to 
assume that all individuals have the same estimates for the expected return, 
variance, and covariance of securities.38  (Finance theorists refer to this 
assumption as the “homogeneous expectations” theory.39)  It is important to 
note that it is not necessary that all market actors are rational or indeed have 
homogenous expectations.40  Indeed, most corporate finance theorists would 
concede that neither assumption is realistic.41  But the basic theories of 
corporate finance can be maintained under conditions in which the market acts 
“as if” these assumptions were true.42  If this is so, then there is one idealized 
optimal portfolio (in terms of mix of risky assets) that all individuals will hold.  
Logic would dictate that this optimal portfolio would reflect the market of 
risky assets—the market portfolio.43  This is represented in a broad-based 
portfolio such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”).44  While it is not 
possible to hold the S&P 500, there are financial products that are designed to 
mimic it.  In addition, the fact that mutual funds make up a large part of 
investor holdings lends credence to the assumption that the market portfolio is 
a suitable proxy for the risky-asset portfolio.  If an individual is less or more 
risk averse, she will either mix her risky assets (market portfolio) with non-
 
 36. Id. at 1615. 
 37. Id. 
 38. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 280. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id; see also William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 433–34 (1964). 
 42. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 21–22 (U. of Chi. Press 
1953). 
 43. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 280. 
 44. See, e.g., S&P 500, http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId= 
spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l--. 
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risky assets (e.g., Treasury-bills) or borrow (leverage) to acquire more of the 
optimal risky asset portfolio.45 
It is difficult to overestimate the theoretical and practical significance of 
portfolio theory.  It is the intellectual basis behind the proliferation of mutual 
funds.  While investors had always instinctively diversified their asset 
holdings, Markowitz laid the foundation for a scientific/mathematical approach 
to building efficient portfolios and determining the efficient allocation of assets 
given an investor’s risk/return preferences.46  Portfolio analysis is theoretically 
simple.  Constructing portfolios was computationally difficult, however, until 
there were adequate advances in computing skills that allowed investment 
managers to engineer efficient portfolios—hence, the explosion in the mutual 
fund business.  Portfolio theory also served as the basis for core developments 
in corporate finance theory to follow.47 
The implication that investors will choose to hold a market portfolio was 
the central insight that led to the capital asset pricing model.48  The capital 
asset pricing model provides a roadmap for calculating the expected returns 
(and thence, price) for any individual security.49  It was developed by William 
Sharpe in 1964.50  The theory was an extension of Sharpe’s Ph.D dissertation 
that had been written under the tutelage of Markowitz.51 
It is possible to measure the expected price fluctuation of an individual 
security against market portfolio price fluctuations.52  This measurement is 
referred to as , or Beta, in finance theory.53  An investor concerned with the 
riskiness of an individual security will take Beta as its measure given our 
assumption that all investors will choose to hold a market portfolio.  Again, the 
reason why this is the case is that Beta is a measure of the riskiness of the asset 
in relationship to the market (i.e., the investor’s market portfolio to which the 
asset will be added).54  Beta is a commonly found statistic.55  One can find the 
 
 45. Cohen, supra note 34, at 1609–10 
 46. See generally MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION, supra note 28. 
 47. Jeffrey S. Glaser, Comment, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial 
Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 BUS. LAW. 687, 689–70 (1995). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Sharpe, supra note 41, at 435–42. 
 50. Id. at 425. 
 51. William F. Sharpe, Autobiography, Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economics/laureates/1990/sharpe-autobio.html. 
 52. See Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and 
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 206 n.74 
(2001). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See California State University, Fullerton, Business Students’ FAQs: Company Financial 
Information, http://guides.library.fullerton.edu/busifaq/financials.htm. 
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Beta of any publicly traded company readily via the Internet.56  There are a few 
intuitive steps between understanding Beta and calculating the expected return 
for an individual security.  At a minimum, given that the security is a risky 
asset, an investor will demand that it return something greater than returns for 
risk-free assets.57  (This is implied in the risk aversion assumption.)  The 
measure of that “something greater” is represented in the capital asset pricing 
model: 
 
 
where R is the expected return, Rf is the risk-free rate of returns,  is the 
measure of the riskiness of the asset in relationship to the market, and Rm is the 
return on the market portfolio.58  The capital asset pricing model incorporates 
the assumptions that investors seek an efficient mix of risk and return—
combining insights from portfolio theory and the belief that an individual 
investor acting in his or her self-interest drives markets towards efficiency.59 
The idea of market efficiency took prominent place in corporate finance 
with Eugene Fama’s articulation of the efficient market hypothesis in 1970.60  
An efficient market is implicit in the homogeneous expectations assumption 
underlying corporate finance theory.61  In order for the efficient market 
hypothesis to hold true, individual investors must act rationally.62  This does 
not mean that every individual must act rationally but that rationality 
predominates to an extent great enough such that pricing reflects rational 
decision-making.  As discussed previously, the rationality assumption also 
survives if the market behaves “as if” rationality prevailed.  One mechanism 
for this is arbitrage, where savvy investors invest in the market in such a way 
as to take advantage of irrational choices and subsequently force assets to 
efficient price levels.  Another way in which the market can obtain a rational 
outcome in the face of irrationality is when irrational actors effectively cancel 
each other out.  For example, if a similar number of investors both undervalue 
and overvalue an asset, the efficient price should theoretically prevail.63 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Cohen, supra note 34, at 1608. 
 58. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7 at 285. 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 31–40 (discussing rationality assumptions). 
 60. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. AM. FIN. ASS’N 383 (1970) (setting forth the efficient market theory); see also Gill 
North, Efficiency, Fairness & Irrationality: Incompatible or Complementary?, 24 BANKING & 
FIN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2009). 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 40–48 (discussing the homogeneous expectations 
theory). 
 62. North, supra note 60, at 315. 
 63. ROSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 354. 
R = Rf  +  X(Rm – Rf), 
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Fama proposed three forms of efficient markets: weak, semi-strong, and 
strong.64  The weak version presupposes that all former price information is 
reflected in asset pricing.65  The semi-strong definition requires that all public 
information (including past prices) be incorporated in pricing.66  The strong 
version assumes that all information (public and private) is embedded in 
prices.67  At the University of Chicago, (the university home of Savage, 
Markowitz, Sharpe, and Fama) researchers devoted a great deal of attention to 
conducting studies that would prove the efficient market hypothesis correct.68  
These “event studies” were based on analyzing price movements as related to 
information disclosure.69  This empirical research seemed to support the 
efficient market hypothesis (particularly in its weak and semi-strong forms).70  
Corporate finance theorists make limited claims with regard to the three forms 
of the efficient market hypothesis; they claim that the theories stand for the 
proposition that one cannot gain an advantage in investing in the market 
because, depending on the form of the efficient market hypothesis, certain 
information is already reflected in prices.71  Regardless, the lore regarding 
efficient markets that has filtered into the popular conscience is that assets are 
appropriately priced and reflect underlying value.72 
The theoretical architecture of modern corporate finance theory fits well 
with free market ideology.  It hardly comes as a surprise that most of the 
preeminent architects of corporate finance either found their institutional home 
at the University of Chicago or were heavily influenced by it.73  Corporate 
finance was forged in the same University of Chicago crucible that produced 
some of our most prominent free market oriented neoclassical economists: 
Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker, and James 
 
 64. Fama, supra note 60, at 383. 
 65. Id. at 388. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust 
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 656 (1996); see also Henry Manne, Remarks on the Lewis & 
Clark Law School Business Law Forum: Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: Instruction or 
Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 172 (2006). 
 69. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons From Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, 
and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VT. L. REV. 1017, 1026 (1991). 
 70. Id. at 1028–29. 
 71. Merritt B. Fox, The Legal Environment of International Finance: Thinking About 
Fundamentals, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 721, 724–25 (1996) (reviewing HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. 
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATIONS (1995)). 
 72. See William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate 
Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225, 227 (1997). 
 73. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Law and Economics: Is there a Higher Law?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
507, 510 (2008) (describing the University of Chicago as the “taproot of the law and economics 
movement” and the scholars with roots at the institution). 
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Buchanan to name only a select few.74  Four of these economists received the 
Nobel Prize for Economic Science, as did Markowitz and Sharpe.75  Fama’s 
efficient market hypothesis (and, by extension, the capital asset pricing model) 
imply that there is no need for government intervention to adjust prices since 
the market is efficient.76  The market and its individual rational actors are, after 
all, the best organizers of economic activity.  Prices are the market’s signal to 
its individual rational actors.  F.A. Hayek argued that price serves as the 
coordinating device for organizing an economy in an influential article entitled 
The Use of Knowledge in Society.77  Hayek was an inspirational figure for 
Chicago school economists, and his classic, The Road to Serfdom, serves as a 
foundational text for the contemporary conservative movement.78 
A critical implication for the belief in market efficiency and the 
informational role of prices is that there should not be bubbles (artificially high 
prices) in markets.  This belief held sway through such tumultuous economic 
times as the 1980s real estate boom and collapse that led to the savings and 
loan crisis, as well as the boom in the high-tech (“dot-com”) industry in the 
1990s.79  Of course, each of these bubbles burst even while the theory of free 
markets continued to gain political prestige.80  The confidence in free markets 
was even further bolstered in the financial industry because of the scientific 
patina placed on it in light of corporate finance theory.81 
This belief in the free market—particularly in the finance industry—
contributed to a host of deregulatory moves in the last few decades of the 
twentieth century that arguably set the stage for the 2008 financial crisis.  The 
major deregulatory decision was to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.82  The Glass-
Steagall Act, a product of post-Great Depression financial reform, severely 
limited the ability of commercial banks to engage in the insurance and 
securities business.83  Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999 with the passage of 
 
 74. Id.  In fact, Milton Friedman was on Markowitz’s dissertation committee.  Cheng-Few 
Lee, Markowitz, Miller, and Sharpe: The First Nobel Laureates in Finance, 1 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 209, 214 (1991). 
 75. Lee, supra note 74, at 209. 
 76. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 528 (2003). 
 77. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945). 
 78. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
 79. Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to 
Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 979 (2007). 
 80. See Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the 
Politics of Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (2003). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund 
Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 365 
n.25 (2009). 
 83. Id. at 386. 
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the Gramm-Leach-Bliley bill.84  It is perhaps fitting that the major figure 
behind the legislation, then Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas), was a free market 
economist and former professor.85  The impetus for its repeal was a merger by 
the then-named Citicorp (now Citigroup) with Travelers Group (an insurance 
company).86  The merger violated Glass-Steagall, and it would have been 
dissolved if nothing were done to relax regulations.87  In addition to the 
prudential concern of having to possibly unwind one of the major mergers in 
United States history, which reflected the general expansionary direction of the 
financial industry, the belief in free markets had so permeated political 
thinking that Glass-Steagall seemed like an unnecessary regulatory artifact of 
the New Deal era.88  After all, if markets responded well and seemed to 
support the creation of financial companies that acted as “one-stop shops” for 
all financial services needs, the popular conception of efficient markets would 
imply that this was the proper course.  Government intervention to stave off 
such financial conglomeration could only produce inefficiencies.  Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, signed into law by President Clinton, was part of the general 
deregulation ethos that transformed not only the United States but also 
countries around the globe.89 
Milton Friedman was very much the intellectual nova for this free market 
movement.90  He wrote paradigmatic conservative texts such as A Monetary 
History of the United States,91 Capitalism and Freedom,92 and Free to 
Choose,93 as well as doing technical economics.  All the while, the economics 
department, business school, and law school at the University of Chicago were 
continuing to produce and promote an ever growing number of academic stars 
in the fields of economics and finance whose technical acumen was matched, 
 
 84. Id. at 385–86. 
 85. See United States Congress, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
Gramm, William Philip (Phil) Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/bio 
display.pl?index=g000365. 
 86. Robert W. Dixon, Note, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act: Why 
Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s Projected Effects on 
Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 676 (2001). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. George et al., supra note 82, at 387.  See also DANIEL YERGIN, THE COMMANDING 
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING 
THE MODERN WORLD (1998). 
 90. Patricia Sullivan & Carlos Lozado, Economist Touted Laissez-Faire Policy, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 17, 2006, at A01. 
 91. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963). 
 92. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
 93. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
(1980). 
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often times, by their political conservatism.94  The second wave of finance 
theorists would take corporate finance to new technical heights and penetrate 
the core of Wall Street. 
The genesis of this technical development goes back to the initial question 
raised by Markowitz: How do we deal with risk under conditions of 
uncertainty?  But the next generation would take the question a step further: 
How do we master risk?  The answer would lie in options.  In their most basic 
form, options (also known as derivatives) come in two types: calls and puts.95  
A call gives the holder a right to buy an asset at a designated price for a 
contractually agreed upon period of time.96  A put grants the holder the right to 
sell an asset for an agreed upon price during a specified time frame.97  
Derivatives such as put and call options can be sliced, diced, and configured in 
endless ways to create particular risk characteristics.98  They provide investors 
with a vehicle to precisely manage risks.  A key breakthrough in finance theory 
was the derivation of a formula for valuing options—the famous Black-
Scholes model, which was put forward by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 
1973.99  Black-Scholes expands upon the foundation of the capital asset pricing 
model.  Like portfolio theory, Black-Scholes had the benefit of having 
practical applications. 
From the Black-Scholes “simple” equation for valuing standard options, 
the field now referred to as “financial engineering” would develop, in which all 
manner of securities are created to manage and structure risk.100  Financial 
engineers (also referred to as “quants”) are scientists (mathematicians, 
physicists, computer scientists, etc.) who are recruited to Wall Street to create 
 
 94. See Elzinga, supra note 73, at 511 (discussing University of Chicago-produced 
economists’ influence on law and economics); M. Todd Henderson, The Influence of F.A. Hayek 
on Law: An Empirical Analysis, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 249, 264 (2005) (discussing the 
influence of several Nobel Prize winning economists of the “Chicago School”); Sanford M. 
Jacoby, Economic Ideas and the Labor Market: Origins of the Anglo-American Model and 
Prospects for Global Diffusion, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 43, 49 (2003) (describing the 
University of Chicago as “the center of neoclassical conservatism”). 
 95. Michael Parkinson, Option Pricing: The American Put, 50 J. BUS. 21, 24 (1977). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance 
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 184–85 (2000). 
 99. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. 
POL. ECON. 637, 640–45 (1973).  Black and Scholes have both received the Financial Engineer of 
the Year award from the International Association of Financial Engineers.  Press Release, Richard 
Roll Selected as the Recipient of the 2009 IAFE/Sunguard Financial Engineer of the Year Award, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/richard-roll-selected-
as-the-recipient-of-the-2009-iafesungard-financial-engineer-of-the-year-award-79410062.html 
(listing previous winners). 
 100. Huang & Knoll, supra note 98, at 184–85. 
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exotic financial instruments.101  It is a highly technical enterprise utilizing very 
abstract mathematical concepts.  These engineers create instruments ranging 
from synthetic options to other complex derivatives. 
A legendary example of the application (and pitfalls) of option-hedging 
strategies is Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).102  Two of the titans of 
corporate finance theory, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton were among the 
leading lights of LTCM.103  LTCM’s founder, John Meriwether, was a 
trendsetter in recruiting and training scientists to become financial 
engineers.104  With the advent of exponentially more powerful computing, 
financial arbitrage would become the province of science.105  LTCM utilized a 
financial device referred to as portfolio insurance to hedge market risks, made 
bets based on financial models that predicted when certain assets in the market 
were mispriced, and generally created complicated derivatives as a product for 
customers wishing to manage risks.106  Unfortunately, the firm was highly 
leveraged and the equations utilized in its models did not adequately account 
for a dramatic downturn in the credit markets in 1998.107  This led to the 
collapse of the firm.108  Only intervention by the Federal Reserve, led by 
chairman Alan Greenspan, staved off widespread financial calamity in the 
wake of LTCM’s downfall.109  Of course, this may sound familiar given our 
current crisis. 
LTCM was only a sneak preview of what was to come regarding the 
explosion of complex securities created through financial engineering.  With 
regard to understanding the financial crisis of 2008, the instruments at the core 
of the crisis were collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default 
swaps (CDSs).110  Collateralized default obligations are large pools of risky 
assets that are packaged together and sold to investors (frequently in slices 
 
 101. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–12 (2000).  These scientists are frequently recruited from our most 
prestigious scientific institutions such as MIT and Harvard.  Id. 
 102. Leah Nathans Spiro, Dream Team, BUS. WK., Aug. 29, 1994, at 52. 
 103. Id. at 50.  In fact, Robert Merton was another recipient of the Financial Engineer of the 
Year award.  Press Release, supra note 99. 
 104. Spiro, supra note 102, at 54. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; see generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 101 (detailing the demise of LTCM); Darren 
Pain & Jonathan Rand, Recent Developments in Portfolio Insurance, 48 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 37, 
37–46 (2008) (discussing portfolio insurance concepts). 
 107. Anthony Bianco, Outsmarting the Market, BUS. WK., Jan. 22, 2007, at 61. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 201–02 (1999). 
 110. Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
253, 262 (2009). 
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with designated risk characteristics).111  As the real estate boom of the late 
1990s skyrocketed to incredible heights into the new millennium, real estate 
assets (particularly residential real estate) became one of the biggest markets 
for CDOs.112  The essential logic, following Markowitz’s insight regarding 
portfolio diversification, was that since these bundles of assets derived from 
numerous sources, such as home buyers who had taken out mortgages, 
diversification would hedge against risk.  Moreover, sophisticated investors 
could purchase CDSs that acted as a form of insurance against the CDOs either 
to hedge their own stake in mortgage backed CDOs, or to hedge against the 
prospect that the real estate market would collapse. 
The seller of the CDS would promise a payout if the CDO value dipped 
below a certain level.113  Trillions of dollars were tied up in this market.114  
Implicit in this idea was a belief that the real estate market would not collapse 
and, even if it did, CDOs were diversified assets and thus not overly risky 
bets.115  Unfortunately, this logic (bringing back memories of LTCM) failed to 
take into account a central lesson of portfolio theory: systematic risk cannot be 
diversified away.116  Just as the market LTCM created collapsed once the 
credit markets improbably failed, the CDO/CDS market plummeted.117  Once 
real estate prices began to adjust to their “correct” levels, home buyers who 
had over-leveraged themselves with the assistance of unsound lending 
practices could no longer maintain the refinancing cycle that had kept the 
housing bubble afloat.118  The CDO/CDS market became so large because not 
only could investors hedge their bets on CDOs by purchasing CDSs, but 
because they could also buy CDSs without owning CDOs.119  Similar to a put 
option, investors effectively shorted the real estate market by betting that it 
would lose value. 
This activity elevated the risk to all investors, including financial 
institutions.  In the collapse of 2008, this risk was not limited to hedge funds 
 
 111. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of 
the ‘New Financial Architecture,’ 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 566 (2009). 
 112. Id. at 567. 
 113. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 947–48 
(2009).  American Insurance Group (“AIG”) was a prominent example of CDS sellers.  Id. 
 114. Crotty, supra note 111, at 569. 
 115. Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street, WIRED, Mar. 
2009, at 77, 112. 
 116. Roger W. Reinsch et al., Trust Your Broker?: Suitability, Modern Portfolio Theory, and 
Expert Witnesses, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, 178 (2004). 
 117. See Bianco, supra note 107, at 61; Crotty, supra note 111, at 570, 573. 
 118. Hannah Fairfield, In the Shadow of Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at BU4; see 
also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARV. U., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2 
(2008). 
 119. Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation II, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 543, 
550 (2009). 
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like LTCM.120  The risk spread to our most staid financial institutions—
banks.121  In particular, some of our major banks such as Citibank and Bank of 
America were tied up in the CDO/CDS market.122  The deregulatory push that 
opened the way for banks to engage in risky securities activities through 
various sorts of relationships—ultimately culminating in the repeal of Glass-
Steagall—set the stage for the current crisis by allowing financial institutions 
to expand their size and scope of risk.123  The lack of supervision over 
derivatives124 fueled the options frenzy in particular.  In 2000, the U.S. 
Congress, led by Senator Phil Gramm, passed the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act,125 which President Clinton signed into law.126  As a result, 
CDSs and other derivatives were unregulated and allowed to proliferate.  This 
further fueled the housing bubble.127  Again, the pervasive free market ethos 
and popular belief in an efficient market supported deregulation, and it allowed 
banks and other large institutions to assume more risk than ever before. 
The existence of asset bubbles directly contradicts the finance theory 
assembled out of the University of Chicago.  Bubbles only occur when asset 
prices are artificially high and then pop when forces reveal that they have been 
overpriced.128  According to the efficient market ideology, this should not 
occur outside of extremely improbable events.  Nonetheless, Fama actually 
documented the fact that, historically, there have been stock swings that are 
wildly disproportionate to expected events.129  While stocks prices exhibit the 
classic bell-shaped curve, they are not normally distributed and have “long 
tails,” which represent greater than expected odds of large upswings and 
downswings.130  In fact, Fama found that stock fluctuations expected to occur 
once every 7000 years actually occurred once every three to four years.131  
 
 120. Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present and Future, 12 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 125, 129–30 (2008). 
 121. Id. at 130. 
 122. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 
13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 83 (2009). 
 123. Crutchfield George et al., supra note 82, at 387. 
 124. Moran, supra note 122, at 42. 
 125. Commodities Futures Modernizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2006). 
 126. Eric Lipton, Gramm and the ‘Enron Loophole,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/17grammside.html. 
 127. See Moran, supra note 122, at 33 (noting that in order to fuel the market for securitized 
assets, banks increasingly cared less about the credit worthiness of the homebuyer and more about 
their ability to acquire new mortgages and bundle them into securities). 
 128. Eugene F. Fama, Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38  J. BUS. 34, 38 (1965). 
 129. Id. at 36. 
 130. Id. at 49. 
 131. Id. at 50. 
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These observations reportedly led Fama to be circumspect about his former 
student Myron Scholes’ endeavors with LTCM.132 
Of course, historically, asset bubbles, like the 1929 stock crash and 
subsequent depression, have wreaked havoc on financial markets.133  
University of Chicago adherents credited the failure of government monetary 
policy for the Great Depression, among other macroeconomic ills.  Friedman 
discussed this and other monetary policy matters in A Monetary History of the 
United States.134  The Federal Reserve primarily used monetary policy to 
manage the economic fallout of bubbles.135  Greenspan, a free market adherent, 
was loath to place the blame for asset bubbles on markets.136  Government did 
not need to directly regulate economic activity.137  The Federal Reserve could 
ease the crunch caused by bubble phenomenon by pumping money into the 
economy and making sure that the economic carnage was localized.  This 
strategy limited the 1990s dot-com disaster and the fallout from the collapse of 
LTCM.138  Monetary policy is the favored conservative recipe for 
macroeconomic policy because it does not require an expansion of government 
programs.139  In assessing the causes of the most recent financial crisis, Phil 
Gramm, now vice chairman of UBS Investment Bank, has argued that its 
origins can be found in loose monetary policy and government intervention in 
the housing market.140 
 
 132. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 101, at 71–72. 
 133. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
160–61 (2008). 
 134. Id. at 300. 
 135. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1005 (2009) (explaining 
the Federal Rerserve Bank’s response to various bubbles under Greenspan). 
 136. See Alan Greenspan, FRB Chairman, Testimony before the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., Jul. 18, 2001, reprinted in 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 588, 592 (“Too often people are prone to 
recurring bouts of optimism and pessimism that manifest themselves from time to time in the 
buildup or cessation of speculative excesses.”). 
 137. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 135, at 1005–06 (describing that, under Greenspan, the 
Federal Reserve policy in 2002 was to lower interest rates so people could refinance and use the 
money to stimulate the economy, as opposed to directly intervening). 
 138. Id. at 1005. 
 139. See H. Laurence Miller, Jr., On the “Chicago School of Economics,” 70 J. POL. ECON. 
64, 65–66 (1962) (noting that the Chicago school, including Friedman, is attributed for advocating 
limited government and for disfavoring government intervention such as “occupational 
limitations, price controls, and public transfers in kind such as public housing as a matter of 
course”); see also Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and U.S. Monetary History: 1961–2006, 89 
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 153, 154, 161 (2007) (describing how Friedman agreed with the 
Eisenhower Administration’s decision to not aggressively stimulate the aggregate demand to fight 
inflation and Friedman’s general disdain for spending during an inflationary period). 
 140. Phil Gramm, Editorial, Deregulation and the Financial Panic: Loose Money and 
Politicized Mortgages Are the Real Villains, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A17.  Examples of 
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The widespread impact on financial institutions, particularly banks, 
rendered the Federal Reserve ineffective in the face of the disaster.  No matter 
how much money the Federal Reserve pumped into the economy or how 
cheaply it made money available, financial firms did not trust each other 
enough to lend to one another (or others), and the wheels of credit creation 
ground to a halt.141  Firms failed to trust one another because the CDO/CDS 
market had become so pervasive that it impacted a significant portion of major 
financial institutions.142  Everyone was at risk.  This problem was compounded 
by the impossibility of determining how much risk any individual institution 
carried, since the underlying risky assets (the CDOs and CDSs) are so 
complex.143  Financial engineers had created instruments that were so 
complicated that no one, even the creators of the products, could appropriately 
value them.  We had a bubble, but we could not truly appreciate its size and 
consequence.  Rationality and the worship of science had hit the wall in 
finance. 
One group of corporate finance theorists did pay particular attention to 
bubbles and did not view them as mirages.144  Behavioral economics 
challenges the basic tenet of corporate finance theory—market rationality.145  
The claim of behavioralists is not that we are all irrational but that market 
players may have biases sufficient to undermine the rationality assumption, 
undermining the efficient market hypothesis in corporate finance.146  We need 
look no further to find irrational behavior than to the pastime of casino 
gambling.  It is obviously not an even money proposition—it is by definition 
irrational—because casinos would not make a profit otherwise.  Yet, it is a 
thriving business along with state lotteries, which is, of course, another losing 
proposition for players.  Moreover, deviations from rationality are not 
necessarily random and thus do not necessarily cancel one another out.147  
Behavioralists point to certain deviations from rationality that may be 
 
government intervention include lending benchmarks for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
Community Reinvestment Act requirements that financial institutions make best efforts to lend to 
under-served communities.  See id. 
 141. See Moran, supra note 122, at 71–76 (describing the closing of various credit channels 
and the federal response). 
 142. Id. at 71. 
 143. Id. at 40. 
 144. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, at xviii–xix (2d ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE]. 
 145. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE 23–24 (2000). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 12 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristic and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974)); Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social 
Dynamics, 2 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity 457–98 (1984), reprinted in MARKET VOLATILITY 
7, 41 (3d ed. 1991). 
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systemic.148  Investors may routinely draw conclusions from insufficient data 
because the bias of “representativeness” leads them to believe that the last 
outcome is necessarily representative of the next.149  The flip side of this is that 
individuals may be too conservative to adjust to changed conditions.150  Both 
of these phenomena (representativeness and conservatism) can lead to 
bubbles.151 
The phenomenon of bubbles is a chief piece of evidence in the 
behaviorists’ critique of mainstream corporate finance theory.152  In 1981, 
Robert Shiller, a leading behavioral economist, wrote an influential article for 
the American Economics Review entitled “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to 
Be Justified by Subsequent Changes to Dividends?”153  It was a direct assault 
on the efficient market hypothesis.154  The article was based on an analysis of 
swings in the U.S. stock market since the 1920s in an effort to determine 
whether such swings could be explained by expected future dividends.155  The 
answer was no, undercutting the efficient market hypothesis that information is 
accurately reflected in prices.156  The stock market crash of 1987—yet another 
bubble—lent further credence to the growing dissent of behavioralists.157  In 
2000, Shiller wrote his bestselling book Irrational Exuberance, arguing that 
the stock market, which had been experiencing historic highs at the time, was 
actually overpriced, and the bubble was due to pop.158  The market began a 
rapid descent shortly thereafter.159  Shiller based his prediction on a chart that 
showed average stock prices relative to earnings since the nineteenth 
century.160  Inordinately high peaks on the chart corresponded negatively with 
future stock prices.161  Shiller made similar predictions regarding the most 
 
 148. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147, at 1131. 
 149. Id. at 1124–27. 
 150. Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL 
REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17, 17–18 (Benjamin Kleinmuntz ed., 1968). 
 151. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 152–55, 256 (noting that 
representativeness and conservativism can lead to overconfidence which, in turn, can lead to 
bubbles). 
 152. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by 
Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 422 (1981) [hereinafter Shiller, 
Stock Prices Move]; SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 154–78. 
 153. Shiller, Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421. 
 154. See SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 16–17 (describing the article and its import); Shiller, 
Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421–22. 
 155. Shiller, Stock Prices Move, supra note 152, at 421–22. 
 156. Id. at 421, 433–34. 
 157. See SHLEIFER, supra note 145, at 20. 
 158. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 203–09. 
 159. Id. at xii. 
 160. Id. at 6 fig. 1.1. 
 161. See id. 
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recent financial crisis based on historical charts that chronicled real estate 
prices.162  Shiller argued that the real estate market was overinflated.163  
Shiller’s brand of empiricism based on historical trends is precisely the type of 
inductivism scorned by Leonard Savage. 
The methodological approach of behavioralists has some resonance with 
Professor powell’s description of post-Enlightenment ideas.  Powell argues 
that advances in science—in particular, the fundamental insight of quantum 
theory that phenomena at the quantum level are observer dependent—compel 
us to have a more perspectivist view and avoid the pitfall of single viewpoint 
analysis.164  This view is reflected in the behavioralists’ belief that we have to 
have a broader conception of human psychology than the rational actor 
assumption that drives the Chicago school of finance theory and the tendency 
of behavioralists to take history seriously.165  Professor powell highlights the 
point of perspectivism in drawing a connection between the post-
Enlightenment era and the concept of implicit bias in the field of mind 
science.166  He references Marvin Minsky’s argument for recognition of the 
complexity of the mind as opposed to engaging in Enlightenment 
reductionism.167  Recognition of complexity in mind sciences reveals biases 
similar to those discussed by behavioral corporate finance theorists.168 
In a sense, the financial collapse of 2008 (the most severe fallout from an 
asset bubble since the stock market crash of 1929, which led to the Great 
Depression) opens up space for looking beyond the Enlightenment beliefs that 
serve as the foundation for modern finance theory.  This is evident in the 
increased attention to behavioral economics.169  It is also manifest in the steady 
stream of historically-oriented popular books chronicling the current collapse 
 
 162. See id. at 11–27 (suggesting that, based on historical information on home prices in the 
United States and in certain sample cities, the psychological factors of participants in the housing 
market lead to volatility and that high home prices in certain cities may decrease and eventually 
fall over a course of years). 
 163. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 11–27 (analyzing U.S. 
home prices relative to building costs, population, and interest rates, and home prices in sample 
cities, and suggesting that the price increase of homes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 
the 2000s was the result of psychological factors among market participants rather than rational 
economic forces). 
 164. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67. 
 165. Shiller explicitly incorporates “economics, psychology, demography, sociology and 
history” in his analysis, as well as traditional and behavioral finance.  SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at xviii. 
 166. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 144, at 58 (discussing the role 
the “wishful thinking bias” played in the housing bubble). 
 169. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) (advocating use of 
behavioral economics in a variety of policy areas). 
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as well as past financial calamities.170  The story of the rise of behavioral 
economics also points to the resilience of Enlightenment ideals, however.  The 
very scientific ethos that inspired Markowitz and those who followed him in 
developing modern finance theory also motivates behavioral finance 
theorists.171  While Chicago-school corporate finance theorists count Nobel 
Prize winners among their membership, so do behavioralists—namely Daniel 
Kahneman, who led the way in integrating cognitive psychology insights into 
neoclassical economic theory.172  As Kahneman’s work on prospect theory 
(evaluating biases under different scenarios) illustrates, behavioral economists 
and finance theorists are dealing with the same issue that first motivated 
Markowitz and has propelled finance theory—how do we make decisions 
under the cloud of uncertainty?173  Behavioralists take a broader view of 
knowledge acquisition and how to approach this fundamental question.174  In 
broadening our lens, we should not lose sight of the fact that we owe a great 
debt to the Enlightenment ethos that places such a heavy emphasis on the 
acquisition of knowledge.  It is an Enlightenment inheritance that we should 
continue to appreciate and cherish—while remaining vigilant with regard to its 
limitations.  It may very well be the key to propelling us forward in the post-
Enlightenment era. 
  
 
 170. See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 133. 
 171. Markowitz has come to recognize that the rational actor model may need tweaking and 
the consideration of behavioral economics.  Markowitz Interview, supra note 10. 
I think it is perfectly reasonable for people to ask what about the real behavior of investors 
as distinguished from rational behavior.  I do not necessarily subscribe to each article by 
the behavioral economists, but I think it is a reasonable activity to pursue.  I am especially 
interested in simulations that involve asynchronous time, which means that time does not 
go by steady increments necessarily and need not be continuous, but can advance to the 
most imminent event of various kinds.  If you make assumptions about how people in the 
market behave, and put those assumptions inside the simulation, you can see whether 
behavioral theories at the micro level add up to observable market behavior. 
Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147, at 263 (critiquing expected utility 
theory and proposing a new model of decisionmaking under risk, based primarily on observations 
of certain widespread tendencies in human judgment). 
 173. See, e.g., id. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 151–56. 
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